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THE IMPROBABILITY OF INDUCTIVE LOGIC 
Edward F. Becker 
Department of Philosophy 
Un iversity of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
Various conceptions of the nature of logic are considered, leading 
to the view that to have a logic is to have a method of calculating the 
rationality of certain beliefs, or systems of beliefs, on the basis of syn-
tactic properties of sentences. The possibility of developing an induc-
tive logic is then considered in the light of this view. It is concluded 
that the prospects for developing a complete inductive logic are not 
good. 
t t t 
INTRODUCTION 
In some arguments, premises and conclusions are so re-
lated that if the former are true, so, necessarily, are the latter. 
Arguments having this property are said to be valid; those 
which lack it are said to be invalid. Some invalid arguments are 
worthless, but others are not. Among the latter are many 
arguments used by scientists, such as the arguments by which 
laws are inferred from their instances. These arguments, one 
wants to say, do not guarantee the truth of their conclusions, 
but they nevertheless make them more probable. Though not 
valid, they are inductively strong. Thus there arises the idea of 
an inductive logic, a logic which would provide a method for 
determining inductive strength, just as deductive logic pro-
vides a method for determining validity. 
An inductive logic, if one could be developed, would 
give insight into both the nature and the grounds of scientific 
inference. The principles of such a logic would be the prin-
ciples in accordance with which scientific reasoning proceeds, 
and showing such principles to be logical would leave little 
doubt as to their justifiability. The motives for developing an 
inductive logic are thus clear. What is less clear is that such a 
logic is actually possible. In recent years there has been heated 
controversy on this point, with philosophers such as Carnap 
and Hempel defending inductive logic, and other philosophers, 
such as Popper, claiming that there can be no such thing. The 
purpose of this paper is to consider whether anything worthy 
of the name "inductive logic" could ever be developed. 
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THE NATURE OF LOGIC 
An inductive logic would presumably do for the notion of 
inductive strength, or degree of confirmation, what a deduc-
tive logic does for the notion of validity. But what does a 
deductive logic do for the notion of validity? What is an 
inductive logic, anyway? 
According to one traditional account, logic is the study of 
inference, i.e., the study of the principles in accordance with 
which people pass from one belief to another. On this account, 
inductive logic would be the study of those inferences-e.g., 
from the belief that a theory's predictions have invariably come 
out true to the belief that the theory itself is true- which qual-
ify as inductive. Now surely there are such inferences; and, 
surely they could be made an object of a study. Thus on this 
conception of logic the possibility of there being such a thing 
as an inductive logic would be beyond question. 
Of course there are some deductively invalid inferences 
which also are not inductive. The conclusion that a man is in 
for a bad day may be inferred from the premise that his moon 
is in Aquarius, or from the premise that the local witch doctor 
has put a curse on him. If logic is the study of the principles in 
accordance with which people make inferences, then these 
inferences, too, will fall within the purview of logic. In addi-
tion to deductive logic and inductive logic, there will be 
religious logic, voodoo logic, astrological logic, and so on for 
any type of inference that may be named. Perhaps it is this 
line of thought which has led some writers to maintain that 
there is a special logic of religious or ethical reasoning. Such 
writers have tended to welcome this conclusion, apparently 
on the ground that it makes religion and ethics seem every bit 
as rational as science. 
Unfortunately, there is no stopping with ethics and reli-
gion. Suppose there is announced the development of a new 
branch of logic, ginductive logic, which is the study of those 
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inferences that people will accept after consuming a pint of 
gin. Clearly there is a class of such inferences, and clearly they 
could be made an object of a study; so if logic is the study of 
inference, gin deductive logic must be considered one of the 
branches of logic. 
The absurdity of this conclusion shows that the concep-
tion of logic now before us is too broad. Logic involves the 
study of inferences, but inferences can be studied without 
doing logic. Narrower conceptions of the subject must be con-
sidered. One such narrower conception, developed by Quine 
(1966), exploits the notion of a logical word. First, a class of 
logical words is specified: "not," "or," "and," "all," "some," 
"=" (in the sense of identity) would be typical candidates 
for membership. The logical truths are then defined as those 
truths which invariably turn into other truths when any of 
their expressions other than a logical word is replaced by a 
grammatically acceptable substitute. Logic is then defined as 
the study of logical truths. A pair of sentences will stand in 
the relation of logical consequence just in case their corres-
ponding conditional is logically true (Quine, 1966:80-81 
and 110). 
This conception rejects the credentials of voodoo logic 
and astrological logic, while accepting those of the classical 
logic of quantification with identity. Moreover it can accom-
modate such developments as modal logic and deontic logic 
by adding expressions such as "it is necessary that" and "it 
is obligatory that" to the list of logical words. (Quine did not 
deny that modal logic is logic; only that it admits of an ac-
ceptable interpretation.) 
Can this conception be so extended as to count induc-
tive logic as a logic? At first sight, the answer may seem to be 
''yes.'' "Probably" or "it is probable that" could be added to 
the list of logical words. Truths containing only this expression 
and other logical words essentially would then count as logical. 
By analogy with the relation of logical consequence, the rela-
tion of confirmation between sentences P and Q would be 
defmed as logical truth of the conditional (Probably (P~Q)I. 
There is, however, a problem here. (P~QI is equivalent 
to ('VPvQI. Now clearly the probability of a disjunction is 
always at least as high as the probability of its least probable 
disjunct. Thus the probability of ('VPvQI, and hence of 
(P~QI will be high whenever the probability of P is low, 
regardless of the probability of Q; similarly, the probability 
of ('VPvQI and (P~QI will be high whenever the probabil-
ity of Q is high. (Probably (P~Q) 1 will therefore be true 
whenever the probability of P is low or the probability of Q 
is high, the probability of the other component notwithstand-
ing. 
Now consider what happens when P is a statement to 
which our inductive logic assigns low probability. This means 
that high probability must be assigned to (P~QI. Thus 
(Probably (P~Q)I will count as a logical truth when "proba-
bly" is reckoned among the logical words. Hence, if confirma-
tion of Q by P is equated with logical truth of (Probably 
(P~Q)I, it will follow that P confirms Q, Similarly, every 
statement to which our inductive logic assigns low probabil-
ity will, on the conception of logic now before us, confum 
any statement whatsoever. By similar reasoning it could be 
shown that every statement to which our inductive logic as-
signs high probability will, on that same conception of logic, 
be confirmed by any statement whatsoever. 
The problem is that inductive logic, as standardly devel-
oped, disallows these results. On the standard conception, a 
statement P confirms a statement Q just in case the probabil-
ity of Q on the assumption that P is true is higher than it 
would be without that assumption (Haack, 1978: 17; Skyrms, 
1975:9-11). Mere high probability of Q or low probability 
ofP is never sufficient, of itself, to insure that P confirms Q. 
In contrast to standard deductive logic, which equates 
consequence with logical truth of the corresponding condi-
tional, standard inductive logic does not equate confirmation 
of Q by P with logical truth of (Probably (P~Q)I. Thus 
standard inductive logic does not, after all, count as logic 
under Quine's conception. 
Should this result be thought of as an objection to Quine 
or as an objection to inductive logic? Consider an example. 
Suppose it is proposed, as a principle of inductive logic, that 
if a statement e is of the form (<I> a & W 131 and a statement h 
is of the form (y) (<I> 'Y ~ W 'Y) I, then e confums h. It might 
be doubted, of course, that this principle is a co"ect one, but 
what does not seem to be in doubt is that the principle is a 
principle of inductive logic. On Quine's conception of logic, 
establishing that the principle is a logical principle involves 
finding some logical truth to which it corresponds. Since there 
does not seem to be such a logical truth, and since, in any 
event, it is implausible to make the logical character of the 
principle depend upon finding such a truth, Quine's concep-
tion of logic as the study of so-called logical truths must be 
rejected as too narrow, in that it excludes from the realm of 
logic principles which clearly belong there. 
If the class of "logical truths" is too narrow to encom-
pass the principles involved in the study of logic, it is natural 
to suppose that logic could be characterized as the study of 
some broader class of truths, say the class of analytic truths. 
This class would surely number among its members any prin-
ciple of confirmation worthy of being included in an inductive 
logic. Unfortunately, however, it also encompasses principles 
which do not seem to belong to logic of any kind. "All horses 
are animals" is presumably analytic, yet it does not, and 
should not, figure as a principle of any logic. The class of 
analytic truths is thus seen to be too broad to be the subject-
matter oflogic. 
This conclusion applies equally to the classes of a priori 
truths and of necessary truths. "All horses are animals" is 
a priori and necessary as well as analytic, and thus serves to 
show that logic cannot be identified as the study of the truths 
in anyone of these three traditional categories. 
Another familiar proposal concerning the nature of logic 
holds that logic is essentially metalinguistic: To be a logical 
principle is to be a principle about expressions. As it stands 
this is too broad: '''Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is true" would 
count as a principle of logic. Still, this account seems to be on 
the right track. Not all metalinguistic principles are logical, 
but all logical principles are metalinguistic. Logical principles 
can be distinguished from other metalinguistic principles by 
the following characteristics: First, logical principles provide 
the basis for making certain calculations (e.g., the calculations 
involved in constructing a truth table); in this respect they 
obviously differ from many other metalinguistic principles. 
Second, logical principles effect, or at least aim to effect, a 
reduction of non-syntactic properties of sentences to syntactic 
properties of sentences. The calculations licensed by the prin-
ciples are based on syntactic properties of sentences, but the 
purpose of the calculations is to show that sentences have 
certain non-syntactic properties (e.g., truth) or stand in certain 
non-syntactic relations (e.g., implication). With what kinds of 
non-syntactic properties is logic concerned? The answer seems 
to be that logic is concerned with those properties and relations 
that pertain to the rationality of our beliefs. Notions such as 
validity and consistency, for example, are tied to our concep-
tion of rationality in that a person who believed a statement 
known to be inconsistent, or who accepted the premises of 
an argument known to be valid while rejecting its conclu-
sion, would be regarded as irrational. 
These points together lead to the following characteriza-
tion: A logic is a system for determining the rationality of cer-
tain beliefs, or combinations of beliefs, by means of calcula-
tions based on syntactic properties of sentences. This account 
fits syllogistic and quantificationallogic, as well as such further 
developments as modal logic and deontic logic. It also excludes 
such deviations as astrological logic, because failure to accept 
the principles of astrology does not signify irrationality. 
With regard to inductive logic the account gives reasonable 
results without begging any question. It properly accords the 
probability calculus the status of a partial inductive logic, in 
that failure to assign probabilities in accordance with the cal-
culus is a sufficient reason for ascribing irrationality. On the 
other hand, the question whether there could be an inductive 
logic going beyond the probability calculus is left unresolved. 
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The notions of rationality which inductive logic strives to 
explicate-probability, confirmation, evidence-do indeed 
form part of our conception of rationality. A person whose 
beliefs violate the laws of probability, or are not well con-
firmed, or are not in accord with the evidence can justly be 
called irrational. If, therefore, there were a system of princi-
ples on the basis of which questions of probability, confirma-
tion, and evidence could be settled by calculation, such a 
system would be a logic. On the other hand, no such system 
of principles presently exists. According to the conception of 
logic now before us, therefore, no complete system of induc-
tive logic presently exists. 
All of this-that the probability calculus is a partial in-
ductive logic, that a general method for calculating probabili-
ties and confirmation relations on the basis of syntactic 
features would be an inductive logic, that there is not now a 
complete inductive logic-accords with pre-analytic intuition. 
Our account of logic thus seems to give reasonable results 
for inductive logic, as well as for other types of logic. This 
account may, therefore, be taken as providing at least some 
clarification of the concept of logic, and the prospects for 
inductive logic may be considered within the framework it 
provides. 
THE PROSPECTS FOR INDUCTIVE LOGIC 
If logic is what we have said it is, what is to be made of 
the question "Is inductive logic possible?" If logic in general 
is concerned with the rationality of beliefs, inductive logic is 
concerned with the rationality of beliefs arrived at inductive-
ly, with the rationality of what might be called inductively 
determined beliefs. In accordance with what has now become 
fairly common usage, "induction" can be understood to cover 
not only inductive generalization, but any non-deductive in-
ference in which the premises are observation-sentences. An 
inductive logic would then be concerned with the rationality 
of such inferences. It would provide a way of calculating, on 
the basis of syntactical features of sentences, the extent to 
which a hypothesis is confirmed (made probable by) certain 
observations. The question whether such a logic is possible is 
the question whether a method of calculating degrees of con-
firmation on the basis of syntactical features can be found. 
A partial answer to this question is provided by the exis-
tence of the probability calculus. This calculus provides a 
method for determining the probabilities of truth-functional 
compounds, given a knowledge of the probabilities of their 
components, together with a knowledge of their syntactical 
(specifically truth-functional) structure. It thus constitutes a 
partial inductive logic. Such a logic is thus not only possible 
but actual. 
It is clear, however, that much more could be hoped for, 
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namely, a logic which allows determination of the probabili-
ties of statements on the basis of more fine-grained syntactical 
analysis, e.g., analysis of quantificational structure; or, a logic 
which elucidates the relation between theory and observation, 
e.g., between scientific laws and their instances. Whether a 
logic fulfilling these aspirations can be constructed will now be 
considered. 
One argument against the possibility of an expanded 
inductive logic could appeal to the allegedly holistic character 
of confirmation. According to the holistic doctrine, cham-
pioned in recent years by Quine, it is large blocks of theory, 
rather than isolated sentences, which are confirmed by ex-
perience (Quine, 1953:41). If this view is correct, then, it 
might be argued, no inductive logic could ever be developed, 
for, if hypotheses do not even stand in relations of confirma-
tion to observation reports, then, obviously, there could be no 
such thing as determining whether such relations hold on the 
basis of calculations. 
The holistic view could, however, be treated as showing 
not that inductive logic must be abandoned, but that it has 
been misconceived. If inductive logic was supposed to codify a 
relation of confirmation between isolated statements and their 
evidence, then of course, holism would foreclose the possi-
bility of inductive logic. But why must this conception of 
inductive logic be accepted? Presumably inductive logic is 
directed at the confirmation-relation. It need not be said, how-
ever, that observation-reports and isolated hypotheses are what 
stand in this relation. Leaving the door open for holism, we 
can be noncommital as to the nature of the statements that 
get confirmed. If the holist is correct, it is theories that get 
confirmed, but a theory can be regarded simply as a conjunc-
tion of statements. The question whether there could be an 
inductive logic would then turn on the possibility of codify-
ing the confirmation of theories by observation reports. An 
affirmative answer to this question is obviously consistent with 
holism. 
In its insistence that whole theories rather than isolated 
hypotheses are confirmed, holism affirms the complexity of 
one side of the confirmation-relation. Barker (1965:226), 
on the other hand, affirmed the complexity of the other side 
of the relation, the evidential side. His view, in effect, was that 
all inductive arguments are enthemematic. In advancing an 
inductive argument, a speaker claims that his conclusion is 
probable in the light of everything that we know. Thus, 
In an inductive argument the explicitly stated prem-
ises are only a tiny part, although usually the most 
noteworthy part, of the indefmitely vast amount of 
information about the world upon which the conclu-
sion depends. Each bit of this known but unstated 
information has a bearing upon whether the argument 
is inductively valid. But where reasoning involves 
relevant premises so rich that we cannot be sure even 
of stating them completely, we cannot expect to be 
able to impute to the premises and conclusion any 
specific logical form in virtue of which the argument 
would be valid or invalid. 
When Barker spoke of logical form, he had in mind what we 
have called syntax; and when he spoke of an argument as being 
inductively valid, he meant that its premises confirm its con-
clusion. He thus maintained, in effect, that there cannot be 
syntactical criteria for confirmation. 
Judging from the passage just quoted, it would appear 
that Barker's argument for this view turns on his claim that 
the premises of an inductive argument are so rich that "we 
cannot be sure even of stating them completely." In short, 
inability to state the premises of inductive arguments entails 
the impossibility of inductive logic. 
By way of assessing this entailment, imagine that there 
were a way of calculating, on the basis of syntactic properties 
of these sentences, whether e confirms h for every pair of sen-
tences e and h. Surely under these circumstances an inductive 
logic would be available. Yet at the same time, a way of deter-
mining what statements should be included among the sup-
pressed premises of a given inductive argument might very well 
be lacking. How is it that we could have an inductive logic and 
yet still not be able to assess certain inductive arguments? 
An answer emerges if the analogous situation is considered 
with regard to deductive logic, where there actually is a cal-
culus of the kind described. In this case there is clearly a logic, 
yet in the case of many enthemematic arguments, it is not 
possible to say how the missing premises should be supplied. 
Such cases show that the applicability of logic is sometimes 
limited by inability to state all premises of certain real-life 
arguments. Similarly, in the case of inductive logic, inability 
to state the premises of inductive arguments would show not 
that inductive logic is impossible, but only that its applicabil-
ity is limited. To have a logic, it is sufficient to be able to cal-
culate certain relationships between sentences. A logic does 
not tell us how to read others' minds, or to generate a list of 
everything we know. 
A more serious obstacle to the construction of an induc-
tive logic emerges from Goodman's (1955: 17 -2 7 and 66-81) 
work on the problem of lawlikeness. As was seen above, an 
inductive logic involves syntactic criteria of confirmation. One 
type of confirmation with which an inductive logician would 
be particularly anxious to deal is the confirmation of scien-
tific laws by their instances. At first it might seem that in this 
case a syntactic criterion is near to hand. It could be said that 
a statement of the form "All Fs are Gs" is confirmed by a 
statement of the form "A is F and a is G." But this is where 
Goodman's problem comes in. As long as we think in terms of 
statements like "All crows are black," our criterion of con-
firmation seems all right. Unfortunately not all statements of 
the form "All Fs are Gs" are confirmed by their instances. 
"All the men attending this football game are third sons," 
for example, is not confirmed by "Jones is attending this foot-
ball game and is a third son." Generalizations confirmed by 
their instances are termed "lawlike." The problem with our 
proposed syntactic criterion of confirmation is that it would 
incorrectly accord confirmation by their instances to non-
law like generalizations. In order to treat the question of the 
confirmation of scientific laws by their instances in our in-
ductive logic, it would be necessary to distinguish, on syntac-
tical grounds, between lawlike and non-Iawlike generalizations. 
Unfortunately, this does not seem to be possible. "All crows 
are black," and "All the men attending this game are third 
sons" are both of the form "All Fs are Gs." They are, in 
short, syntactically equivalent. The problem of the confirma-
tion of scientific laws by their instances thus appears to be 
beyond the scope of any inductive logic. Hence, insofar as 
inductive logic is conceived as aspiring to deal with this prob-
lem, it must be concluded that such a logic is probably im-
possible. 
Does it then follow that induction, and therefore science 
itself, is illogical or irrational? No. Construction of any logic 
is begun with a stock of inferences regarded as rationally 
justified, and another stock of inferences regarded as not 
rationally justified. Some syntactic relation between sentences 
which is coextensive with the relation of rational justification 
for the sentences in question is then sought. To succeed in 
this effort is to invent a logic. It would be a mistake, however, 
to view the construction of the logic as demonstrating the 
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rationality of the inferences in question. On the contrary: 
the rationality of the inferences is presupposed in the con-
struction of the logic. The question whether a logic can be 
constructed for a given class of inferences is not the question 
whether those inferences are rational; it is the question 
whether their rationality has a syntactic correlate. The con-
clusion that inductive inferences cannot be treated formally 
should shake our faith in the rationality of science no more 
than Godel's incompleteness theorem has shaken our faith in 
the rationality of mathematics. 
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